Monetary Policy and Bank Lending by Anil Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein





Working Paper No. 4317




Paper prepared for NBER Conference on Monetary Policy. We thank Ben Bernanke, Martin
Eichenbaum, Mark Gertler, Bruce Greenwald and Eugene Fama for helpful conversations. Owen
Lamont for research assistance, Michael Gibson for kindly providing data, and Maureen
O'Donnell for help in preparing the manuscript. We are also grateful to the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, University of Chicago IBM Faculty Research Fund, the National Science
Foundation and MiT's International Financial Services Research Center for research and financial
support. We gratefully acknowledge the Bradley Foundation for financial support. This paper
is part of NBER's research program in Monetary Economics. Any opinions expressed are those





This paper surveys recent work that relates to the "lending" view of monetary policy
transmission. It has three main goals: 1) to explain why it is important to distinguish between
the lending and "money" views of policy transmission; 2) to outline the microcconomic
conditions that arc needed to generate a lending channel; and 3) to review the empirical evidence
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and NBER1. Introduction
In this paper, we survey recent theoretical and empirical work that relates to the
"lending" channel of monetary policy transmission. To begin, we.need to define clearly what
is meant by the lending channel. It is perhaps easiest to do so by contrasting the lending view
of monetary policy transmission with the simpler, and better-known, money" view.
In what we take to be the polar, pure money version of the monetary transmission
mechanism, there are effectively only two assets --moneyand bonds. In this world, the banking
sector's only special role has to do with the liability side of its balance sheet --thefact that it
can create money by issuing demand deposits. On the asset side of their balance sheets, banks
do nothing unique --likethe household sector, they too just invest in bonds.
In this two asset-world, monetary non-neutrality arises if movements in reserves affect
real interest rates. The transmission works as follows: a decrease in reserves reduces the
banking sector's ability to issue demand deposits. As a matter of accounting, this implies that
the banking sector must also hold (on net) fewer bonds. Thus the household sector must hold
less money, and more bonds. If prices do not adjust fully and instantaneously, households will
have less money in terms,and equilibrium will require an increase in real interest rates.
This in turn can have real effects on investment, and ultimately, on aggregate economic activity.
Note that as we have defined the pure money view of the transmission mechanism --
solelyby reference to the fact that it is characterized by the simple two-asset feature --thereare
a wide range of alternative formulations that capture its essence. These include the texthook IS-
LM model, as well as the dynamic equilibrium/cash-in advance models of Rotemberg (1984),
Grossman and Weiss (1983), Lucas (1990) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). Although
1these two classes of models differ along a number of dimensions, (e.g., in the way they generate
incomplete price adjustment) they share the two-asset feature.
By contrast, we say there is a distinct lending channel of monetary policy transmission
when the two-asset simplification is inappropriate in a specific sense. In the lending view, there
are three assets —money,publicly issued bonds, and intermediated 1oans" --thatdiffer from
each other in meaningful ways and must be accounted for separately when analyzing the impact
of monetary policy shocks. The banking sector now can be special in two relevant ways: in
addition to creating money, it makes loans, which (unlike buying bonds) the household sector
cannot do.
In this three-asset world, monetary policy can work not only through its impact on the
bond-market rate of interest, but also through its independent impact on the supply of
intermediated loans. To think about the distinction between the money and lending channels,
take an extreme example where households view the two assets that they do hold —moneyand
bonds —asvery close substitutes. In this case, a decrease in reserves that leads to a decline in
the money supply will have a minimal impact on the interest rate on publicly-held bonds. Thus
the money channel is very weak. However, the decrease in reserves can still have important real
consequences, if it leads banks to cut back on loan supply: the cost of loans relative to bonds
will rise, and those firms that rely on bank lending (say because they do not have access to
public bond markets) will be led to cut back on investment. Put differently, monetary policy
can have significant real effects that are not summarized by its consequences for open-market
interest rates.
A couple of points about the lending view should be emphasized right away, to prevent
2further confusion. First, as we have defined it, the lending view centers on the premise that
bank loans and publicly issued bonds are not perfect substitutes. It does not hinge critically on
whether or not there is quantity rationing in the loan market. As a matter of practical reality,
shifts in bank loan supply may well be accompanied by variations in the degree of rationing, but
this is not necessary for there to be a meaningful lending channel.
Second,muchlike with the pure money view, the essence of the lending view can
probably be captured in a wide range of models. This may not be immediately apparent,
beuse the lending channel has received much less modelling attention than the money channel.
Indeed, the only recent modelling attempts that we know of are essentially extensions of the IS.
LM framework, most notably Bernanke and Blinder (1988). However, as we will argue below,
the important aspects of the lending view transcend the specific IS-LM style formulation adopted
by Bernanke and Blinder; for example, they could in principle be captured in dynamic
equilibrium/cash-in-advance models also.
Having defined (loosely) what we mean by the distinction between the money and the
lending channels, much of the remainder of this paper focuses on the following two sets of
questions:
(Qi) As a matter of theory, what TMmicrofoundations" are required for a distinct lending
channel to exist? Does it appear that the necessary pre-conditions for a lending channel are
satisfied in today's fmancial environment? Are they apt to be satisfied in the future?
(Q2) Is there any direct evidence that supports the existence of a distinct lending channel?
If so, how important in magnitude is the lending channel?
Before proceeding however, there is a logically prior question that must be addressed,
3namely: Why is the distinction between the money and lending channels an interesting or
important one? Although we must defer a complete answer until later in the paper, we can offer
several brief observations:
1) If the lending view is correct, monetary policy can have important effects on
investment and aggregate activity without moving open-market interest rates by much. At the
least, this suggests that one might wish to look to alternative indicators to help gauge the stance
of policy.
2) Standard investment and inventory models —whichtypically use open-market rates
as a measure of the cost of financing --maygive a misleading picture of the extent to which
different sectors are directly affected by monetary policy. For example, most empirical work
fails to find a significant connection between inventories and interest rates. As we argue below,
it is probably wrong to conclude from this work that tight monetary policy can not have a strong
direct impact on inventory behavior.
3) The quantitative importance of the lending channel is likely to be sensitive to a number
of institutional characteristics of the financial markets (e.g., the rise of "non-bank banks", the
development of the public "junk bond" market, etc.). Thus understanding the lending channel
is a prerequisite to understanding how innovation in financial institutions might influence the
potency of monetary policy.
4) Similarly, the aggregate impact of the lending channel may depend on the financial
condition of the banking sector. As we argue below, when bank capital is depleted (and
particularly when bank loan-making is tied to risk-based capital requirements) the lending
channel is likely to be weaker. This has obvious implications for the ability of monetary policy
4to offset particular sorts of adverse shocks.
5) Finally, the lending view implies that monetary policy can have distributional
consequences that would not arise were policy transmitted solely through a money channel. For
example, the lending view suggests that the costs of tight policy might fall disproportionately
on smaller firms who are unable to access public capital markets.Such distributional
considerations may be important to bear in mind when formulating policy.
Although this list is far from exhaustive, it hopefully gives some idea of the potential
usefulness of understanding and quantifying the lending view. With this motivation in mind, the
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a very brief history of the
thought surrounding the lending view. Section 3 examines its microfoundations. Section 4
reviews the evidence that bears most directly on the lending view.
2. Early Work on the Lending View
The lending view of monetary policy transmission has, in one form or another, been
around for a long time. Much of the early work tended to blur together two logically distinct
issues: 1) whether monetary policy works in part by changing the relative costs of bank loans
and open-market paper; and 2) whether such shifts in bank loan supply are accompanied by
variations in the degree of non-price credit rationing.
Roosa's (1951) "availability doctrine" is a classic example of this line of thinking. He
takes issue with the simple money channel view that: "changes in market rates of interest
provided a satisfactory explanation for cyclical economic disturbance ...Thepostwar
experience suggests that yield changes of scarcely 1/8 of 1 percent for the longest-term bonds
have considerable market effects." Rather, Roosa argues, "it is the lender, neglected by the
5monetary theorists, who does most to put new substance in the older doctrine. .. ratechanges
brought about by the open market operations of the central bank influence the disposition or the
ability of lenders to make funds available to borrowers. .. Itis principally through effects upon
the position and decision of lenders. .. thatcentral bank action. .. achievesits significance.
Although Roosa's observations came in the midst of the debate over whether monetary policy
effectiveness after the impending Federal Reserve --TreasuryAccord would necessitate large
swings in open market interest rates, the importance of bank credit continued to be a hotly
debated topic long after the Accord was signed.
Over the next dozen years the argument was refined, and a number of investigators,
notably Tobin and Brainard (1963), Brunner and Meltzer (1963) and Brainard (1964), proposed
models that included as a central feature the imperfect substitutability of various assets including
bank loans. Thus, Modigliani (1963) was able to more precisely summarize the role of banks
in a world of imperfect information. "Suppose the task of making credit available to units in
need of financing requires specialized knowledge and organization and is therefore carried out
exclusively by specialized institutions which we may label financial intermediaries.
Intermediaries in turn lend to final debtors of the economy at some rate. .. (which)adjusts at
best only slowly to market conditions.. .thesingle rate of the perfect market model is replaced
by a plurality of rates."
Despite the fact that the Modigliani rendition of the lending view is very close to the one
that we are now advocating, the lending view began to fall out of favor during the l960s. In
'See also Tobin and Brainard (1963) and Brainard (1964) for early general equilibrium models
of financial intermediation with imperfect substitutability across assets.
6part, this lack of acceptance seems attributable to the fact that many early accounts relied heavily
(and unnecessarily, in our view) on a credit rationing mechanism, while at the same time failing
to provide a satisfying theoretical rationale for such rationing to exist. For example, Samuelson
(1952) rebutted Roosa by arguing that the credit rationing implicit in the availability doctrine was
at odds with profit maximization by lenders. More importantly, as Gertler (1988) points out,
the Modigliani and Miller results on the irrelevance of capital-structure seemed to undermine the
basic premise that lending arrangements could be important. Furthermore, on the empirical
front, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) were supplying strong evidence in favor of the money
view.
As we will discuss in the remainder of the paper, each of these objections has
subsequently been addressed. For instance, work by Jaffee and Russell (1976), Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) and many others has demonstrated that credit rationing can occur in models where
all agents are maximizing.2 More generally, as we argue in the next section, research in the
theory of credit market imperfections and financial intermediation has helped put the lending
view on much firmer micro-foundations. Still, the failure of the lending view to be widely
embraced cannot be completely ascribed to theoretical discomfort --ithas also suffered until
recently from a lack of clear-cut, direct empirical support. Thus, perhaps even more so than
the theoretical developments, the recent empirical work reviewed in Section 4 has helped to
renew interest in the lending view.
2lndeed, Blinder and Stiglitz (1983) and Fuerst (1992b) outline models of monetary policy
transmission that capture the credit rationing aspects of Roosa's (1951) availability doctrine.
73. Building Blocks of the Lending View
Perhaps the best-known recent formulation of the lending view is a model due to
Bernanke and Blinder (1988). Their model makes it clear that there are three necessary
conditions that must hold if there is to be a distinct lending channel of monetary policy
transmission:
(Cl) Intermediated loans and open-market bonds must not be perfect substitutes for some
firms on the liability side of their balance sheet. In other words, the Modigliani-Miller capital
structure invariance proposition must break down in a particular way, so that these firms are
unable to offset a decline in the supply of loans simply by borrowing more directly from the
household sector in public markets.
(C2) The Federal Reserve must be able, by changing the quantity of reserves available
to the banking system, to affect the supply of intermediated loans. That is, the intermediary
sector as a whole must not be able to completely insulate its lending activities from shocks to
reserves, either by switching from deposits to less reserve-intensive forms of finance (e.g., CDs,
commercial paper, equity, etc.) or by paring its net holdings of bonds.
(C3) There must be some form of imperfect price adjustment that prevents any monetary
policy shock from being neutral. If prices adjust frictionlessly, a change in nominal reserves
will be met with an equiproportionate change in prices, and both bank and corporate balance
sheets will remain unaltered in real terms. In this case, there can be no real effects of monetary
policy through either the lending channel or the conventional money channel.
If either of the first two necessary conditions fail to hold, loans and bonds effectively
become perfect substitutes, and we are reduced back to the pure money view of policy
8transmission. If (Cl) fails, Modigliani-Miller corporations will completely arbitrage away any
cost differentials between loans and bonds. If (C2) fails, intermediaries will do the arbitrage.
In either case, the net result will be that loans and bonds will always be priced identically in
equilibrium.
Although the Bernanke-Blinder formulation is very helpful in illustrating the necessary
conditions that are required for the existence of a distinct lending channel, it does not directly
address whether each of these three conditions can be given solid microfoundations. Nor does
it ask whether any such microfoundations appear plausible given the current fmancial
environment. For example: what sort of technological and/or informational assumptions must
one make about the structure of intermediation to generate (C2)? Do these assumptions seem
reasonable in light of what we actually observe?
In the rest of this section, we take up these questions relating to microfoundations. To
preview the discussion a bit: We begin by arguing that (Cl) is probably easiest to justify, both
in the context of a widely-accepted, well-articulated theoretical paradigm, and in terms of what
is observed in practice. On the other hand, (C2) is quite a bit trickier —thereare a number of
possible factors that could conceivably limit the Fed's ability to affect the supply of
intermediated loans. Our bottom line here is that it is nonetheless highly unlikely that (C2) will
fail to hold completely, although one can imagine circumstances in which Fed policy might have
only a small impact on aggregate loan supply.
Finally, the question of the microfoundations for (C3) is much broader in scope than just
the lending channel --thisquestion is central to y account of monetary policy, and has
accordingly received an enormous amount of attention. Thus we do not attempt a detailed
9treatment here. Instead, we focus on a much narrower issue: the interaction between the
microfoundations for (C3) with those for (Cl) and (C2). In particular, we focus on a class of
models --thoseof the dynamic equilibrium/cash-in-advance variety --wherethe frictions driving
imperfect price adjustment can be one and the same as those driving intermediary lending policy.
We ask whether these sorts of models are likely to be successful in providing a realistic account
of both price adjustment and intermediary lending patterns.
3.1 Why do some firms "depend" on intermediated loans?
In the last decade or so, a large theoretical literature has developed on the subject of
financial intermediation. One broad theme of this work, (seen, e.g., in Diamond (1984), Boyd
and Prescott (1986), and Fama (1990)) is that intermediaries can represent efficient vehicles for
conserving on the costs of monitoring certain types of borrowers. The basic idea is this: due
to asymmetric information and/or moral hazard, lending without any monitoring can involve
large deadweight costs. Given these costs, it would be efficient to devote some resources to
monitoring activities. However, if there are a large number of lenders —i.e.,if the credit is
extended in public markets —freerider problems will confound attempts to monitor. Thus it
can make sense to create an intermediary to serve as a single "delegated monitor", thereby
circumventing these free-rider problems and conserving on aggregate monitoring costs.
While ultimately correct, this argument is, by itself, incomplete. Although having a
single intermediary do all the monitoring would seem to represent an obvious cost savings, there
is a potential difficulty, namely the introduction of a second layer of agency. This point is
addressed by Diamond (1984), who asks the critical question: "who monitors the delegated
monitor?" In other words, what is to prevent the intermediary from taking investors' money and
10squandering it by making bad loans (i.e, by lending without going to the effort of actually doing
any monitoring)? Diamond shows that this second-tier agency problem can be mitigated if the
intermediary holds a large, diversified portfolio of loans, and finances itself largely with publicly
issued debt.
Diamond's conclusions about the optimal capital structure for an intermediary raise an
issue that is central for monetary policy. Although Diamond argues that intermediaries ought
to be largely debt financed, there is nothing in his model --orin many of the other models of
financial intermediation --thatsuggests that intermediaries must be financed with demand
deposits. Indeed, the institutions in many of these models can equally well be thought of as
"non-bank banksw; i.e, finance companies such as G.E. Capital that make loans but that do not
finance themselves at all with deposits.
Thus while it seems relatively straightforward to argue from first principles that some
firms --particularlythose for whom monitoring costs are likely to be high --willbe to some
degree intermediary-dependent, it is less obvious that they will necessarily be bank-dependent,
in the sense of relying on institutions who themselves are financed with demand deposits. In
terms of the necessary conditions we have defined above, this distinction implies some initial
doubts about whether one should expect (C2) to hold across a wide range of circumstances. If
intermediation can just as easily be done through institutions that fund themselves with non-
reservable forms of finance (e.g., commercial paper, long-term debt, etc.) then it is unclear how
the Federal Reserve could ever affect the aggregate supply of intermediated loans. This question
will be taken up in detail in Section 3.2 below; for the moment we put aside the important
distinction between deposit-taking banks and intermediaries more generally.
11In addition to the theoretical work, there have also been a number of recent empirical
papers that support the notion that intermediated loans are "special" for some borrowers.
First, Fama (1985) and James (1987) show that bank borrowers effectively bear the cost of
reserve requirements, which suggests that they are getting a service which cannot be replicated
by non-bank providers of finance, such as the public markets. Second, James (1987) and
Lummer and McConnell (1989) find that bank loan agreements are taken as 'goed news" by the
stock market, consistent with the notion that banks provide an information gathering function.
Finally, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) show that Japanese firms with close banking
relationships are less likely to be liquidity constrained. This finding fits with the argument that
monitoring by intermediaries reduces the information and/or incentive problems that typically
create a wedge between the costs of internal and external finance.
It is one thing to believe that certain firms will be dependent on the services of the
intermediary sector. It is quite another to believe that firms may come to rely on a particular
intermediary with whom they have an established relationship --inother words, that there are
lock-in effects that make it costly to switch lenders. However, as we argue below, if lender-
specific lock-in does indeed exist, it can have important consequences for the transmission of
monetary policy --suchlock-in will tend to make the lending channel more potent, all else
equal.
A few recent papers, both theoretical and empirical, provide some support for the
hypothesis that banking relationships involve a degree of lock-in. On the theoretical side, Sharpe
(1990) and Rajan (1992) argue that the very fact that a bank does monitoring creates the
potential for lock-in. In the course of a relationship, a bank will acquire an informational
12monopoly with respect to its client, a monopoly which puts other potential lenders at a
comparative disadvantage.
On the empirical side, Sushka, Slovin and Polonchek (1993) conduct an interesting event
study of Continental Bank's customers during the period that Continental was in danger of failing
and was ultimately bailed out by the government. During this time, the customers' stock prices
moved in concert with Continental's own fortunes, falling on bad news about Continental, and
rising sharply with the announcement of the bailout. This suggests that these customers were
somewhat locked-in to Continental, and could not costlessly switch to another lender. Further
evidence for the importance of banking relationships comes from Petersen and Rajan (1992).
They find that the availability of credit to a small business is, all else equal, an increasing
function of the length of its relationship with its bank.
Of course, even if one accepts that (Cl) is both theoretically and empirically plausible,
there remains the question of its aggregate importance, not only today, but looking into the
future. Certainly there are a substantial number of U.S. firms that cannot be considered
intermediary-dependent in any sense. Moreover, the evidence from the U.S. as well as other
countries suggests that there is a strong secular trend away from intermediated finance, and
towards securities markets.
In spite of such trends, the data show that intermediaries --andbanks in particular
--continueto play a dominant role in financing U.S. corporations, particularly medium-sized
and smaller ones. (We review some evidence to this effect just below, in Section 3.2A.) Thus
it seems reasonable to believe that shocks to the supply of intermediated loans might have
important aggregate implications, even in today's environment.
133.2 Can the Fed affect the supply of intermediated loans?
The second necessary condition for the existence of a distinct lending channel is that the
Fed be able --bymanipulating the amount of reserves available to the banking sector --toaffect
the aggregate supply of loans made by intermediaries. We examine four factors that could
conceivably weaken or even break the link between reserves and loan supply: 1) the existence
of non-bank intermediaries; 2) banks' ability to react to changes in reserves by adjusting their
holdings of securities rather than loans; 3) banks' ability to raise funds with non-reservable
forms of financing; and 4) the existence of risk-based capital requirements.
3.2.A The significance of non-bank intermediaries
As noted above, many theories of financial intermediation leave open the possibility that
lending to information-intensive" borrowers could be accomplished by non-deposit taking
institutions.If such institutions play an important role, the link between Fed policy and
aggregate loan supply might be weakened, or even severed. First, and most obviously, if non-
bank intermediaries are responsible for most of the lending volume in the economy, the Fed will
be unable to have much of an impact on the overall supply of intermediated loans, even if it can
influence 12nkloansupply.
Second, and more subtly, one might argue that even if non-bank intermediaries do not
have a large market share, they may effectively be the "marginal" lenders in the economy --that
is, they may be able to pick up much of the slack if bank loan supply is cut back. However,
we view this marginal lender argument as not completely compelling, particularly with regard
to its short-run implications. It implicitly assumes that there are negligible costs incurred when
borrowers switch from one lender to another. As seen in the previous section, there are both
14theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that such an assumption is inappropriate --thatthere
is indeed a significant degree of lock-in between specific banks and their customers.
Thus if one is interested in understanding relatively short-run behavior, there may be
something useful to be learned simply from comparing the relative sizes of the bank and non-
bank intermediary sectors.
Figure 1 addresses this question, showing how the composition of intermediated loans
to non-financial corporations breaks down into bank C&I loans and finance company loans over
the period 1977-91. In addition, the figure also sheds some light on the issue raised above --
thesubstitution of open market borrowings for intermediated loans —byincluding data on the
growth of the commercial paper market over this period.
The figure illustrates that while both finance company loans and commercial paper have
grown very rapidly in percentage terms over the last 15 years, traditional commercial banks still
are by far the most important of these three sources of finance, representing over 68% of the
combined total in 1991. (The share was on the order of 78% in 1977). Thus it would be
premature to say that growth in either the commercial paper market or in the non-bank
intermediary sector has rendered the commercial banking sector of significantly less aggregate
importance than it was, say, a couple of decades ago.
Table 1 presents some more detail on how corporate financing patterns have evolved over
the last twenty or so years. Using data from the Quarterly Financial Report, we break down
manufacturing firms into three size categories --small,medium, and large --andlook at how
the balance sheets of firms in each category have changed between 1973 and 1991.
Again, the most striking finding is that if we take the overall manufacturing-wide ratio
15of bank debt to total debt, there is virtually no change over time. Bank debt represents 34.4%
of total debtin 1973,and 33.0% in 1991. This aggregate number reinforces the conclusion
drawn above — that one should notexaggeratethe extent to which changes in financing practices
havediminishedtherole of banks.
Of course, banks have lost substantial ground in some areas. First, if one focuses only
on short-term lending, banks have seen their overall share fall from 78.8% to 44.9%. (This is
offset by the fact that banks have actually gained share in overall long-term lending.) Moreover,
this loss of short-term market share is almost exclusively concentrated among large corporations
-- the one place where the commercial paper market has made very substantial inroads.3 Short-
term bank loans as a fraction of all short-term debt of large manufacturing corporations fell from
64.9% in1973 to 22.8% in 1991.
Whilethe gains of the commercial paper market among large borrowers are certainly
impressive, their aggregate impact should not be overstated. Commercial paper has not yet
penetrated the medium and small firm categories to any perceptible degree, and banks' share of
short-term debt for these firms is still overwhelming, at 77.0% and 82.9% respectively.
3.2.A.1 The future of non-bank intermediaries
Looking to the future, the rise of non-bank intermediaries documented in Figure 1 raises
a number of difficult questions. At one extreme, some observers -- particularly advocates of
3.These figures may somewhat overstate the true economic extent of disintermediation, as
approximately 8% of commercial paper issues are backed by irrevocable standby letters of credit
from banks -- see Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). In such cases, banks still bear the full credit
risk, and presumably engage in monitoring.- More generally, a number of other financial
innovations — e.g., the loan sales market -- have blurred the lines between intermediated and
public-market sources of finance.
16"narrow banking"-- have concludedthat there is no longer any reason (other than perhaps
historical accident or bad regulation) why the deposit-taking and loan-making functions should
ever be glued together in a single institution, as opposed to being carried out separately, say by
money market mutual funds and finance companies, respectively. What exactly, ask these
observers, are the synergies between deposit-taking and loan-making? If no clear-cut synergies
can be identified, one might expect the non-bank sector to grow rapidly in the future, thereby
diluting the potency of any lending channel of policy transmission. (See Gorton and Pennacchi
(1990) for a forceful rendition of this argument.)
The work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provides something of a counterpoint to the
Gorton-Pennacchi argument. The Diamond-Dybvig model suggests that there may indeed be a
link between the deposit-taking and loan-making functions of banks. In their model, banks
perform a "liquidity transformation" role. All individual investors would like to invest in highly
liquid assets, because they may suddenly wish to consume all of their wealth. But the
economy's productive investment opportunities require tying up resources in long-lived projects.
In this setting, it is optimal for a bank to issue demand deposits --therebysatisfying individuals'
liquidity needs —andto invest the proceeds in the long-lived assets.4
Thus a synergy between deposit-taking and loan-making arises out of a fundamental
mismatch between individuals' desire to hold liquid assets and the economy's need to invest in
iffiquid projects. However, the Diamond-Dybvig model probably overstates the importance of
the liquidity transformation synergy, since they simply assume that all investment opportunities
4Diamond-Dybvig show that, in this setting, bank deposits perform a role that cannot be
duplicated by other tradeable claims, such as equity shares issued against the long-lived projects.
17are long-term and all savers want to keep all their wealth in liquid assets. In reality, there may
not be nearly as much of a mismatch between savers' portfolio preferences and the underlying
investment technology --therewill be both some investment opportunities that are relatively
short-term, and some investors who are not unwilling to tie up their assets for a longer period
of time. Gorton and Pennacchi present some evidence that bears on this point. One fact that
they emphasize is that the sum of outstanding Treasury bills and non-fmancial commercial paper
is now roughly twice as large as the level of checkable bank deposits. This is a recent
development --bankdeposits were larger until around 1980 --andit suggests that it might soon
be possible to have a world in which deposit-taking is done largely by institutions (like money
market mutual funds) that invest primarily in high-quality, short-term liquid assets. Inevitably,
however, these sorts of thought exercises run into difficult general equilibrium considerations.
As Gorton and Pennacchi themselves point out, simply showing that the volume of T-bills and
commercial paper greatly exceeds bank deposits is not conclusive proof that there is no role in
equilibrium for traditional, "liquidity transforming" banks in the Diamond-Dybvig spirit. After
all, T-bills and commercial paper outside the deposit-taking system may already be satisfying
some of the economy's demand for liquidity, so it would be wrong to posit that one could take
them and use them as backing for deposits without losing anything.
Our own view is that while the Gorton-Pennacchi argument has a great deal of merit, it
is hard to predict with any confidence that we will soon see anything like a disappearance of
traditional dual-function commercial banks. Perhaps the greatest uncertainties have to do not
with the economic considerations sketched above, but with regulation. Even if one completely
accepts the hypothesis that there are no real economic synergies holding deposit-taking and loan-
18making together, government regulations can provide a powerful glue. For example, deposit
insurance subsidies may be effectively larger for those banks that invest in risky loans rather
than T-bills, thereby encouraging a combination of the two activities.
In this regard, one important regulatory innovation is the introduction of risk-based
capital requirements. As we discuss in Section 3.2.D, these may have the effect of accelerating
any natural separation of deposit-taking and loan-making.
3.2.B Banks' holdings of securities as a buffer against reserve shocks
Even ignoring the issues raised by the existence of non-bank intermediaries, it is still
possible that bank lending might be decoupled from open-market operations. Suppose that as
a result of a monetary tightening, a bank finds that its deposits have been reduced by $1. How
will the bank respond? Basically, it can adjust along one of three dimensions: 1) it can cut back
on the number of loans it makes; 2) it can sell some of its securities holdings (e.g., T-bills); or
3) it can attempt to raise more non-deposit financing (e.g., CDs, medium-term notes, long-term
debt, or equity). In order for (C2) to be satisfied, it must be that the bank wishes (for a given
configuration of rates on the different instruments) to do some of the adjustment by reducing
loans. Or said differently, it must be that the bank is not wholly indifferent to variations in the
quantity ofT-bills and/or CDs, and thus does not use such variations to completely "shield its
loan portfolios from monetary shocks. (Note that selling T-bills and issuing CDs are closely
related strategies --eithercan be thought of as reducing the bank's net holding of "bonds,
broadly defined.)
Why might a bank not be indifferent to variations in T-bills or CDs? We start with T-
bills first. The argument here is straightforward, and has been made by many authors. (See,
19e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1987)). At any point in time, a bank faces the possibility of random
depositor withdrawals. If the bank holds all its assets (other than required reserves) in illiquid
loans, it will have a difficult time accommodating these withdrawals while still meeting reserve
requirements. In particular, it will be forced to liquidate loans on short notice, which could be
very costly.Byholding easily marketable securities such as T-bills, the bank avoids these
illiquidity costs.
Of course, there is a tradeoff involved in holding T-bills, since they offer a lower return
than intermediated loans. This suggests that for any given level of deposits, and any given
configuration of interest rates on loans and bills, there will be a unique optimal quantity of bill
holdings. In other words, banks will nQL be indifferent to the amount of T-bills they hoId.
Table 2 presents some data on banks' holdings of securities, taken from the Call Reports.
The data show that there are persistent cross-sectional differences in banks' portfolio
composition. In particular, large banks --thosein the top 1 % as measured by total assets --
holdsignificantly less in the way of securities than do medium-sized banks, who in turn hold less
than small banks. These well-defined cross-sectional patterns would be very unlikely if portfolio
composition was a matter of indifference to banks. In contrast, they are exactly what one might
expect if banks traded off the liquidity of securities against their lower returns: smaller banks,
with fewer depositors, are more vulnerable to large (percentage) withdrawals, and hence must
5See Greenwald and Stiglitz (1992) for extension of these arguments and a general analysis of
the consequences of risk-aversion by banks.
20protect themselves by holding more securities.6
3.2.C Banks' ability to make use of non-reservable forms of finance
We now turn to thequestionof why a bank does not offset a loss in deposits solely by
issuing more CDs --i.e,why it is not indifferent to variations in the quantity of CDs it has
outstanding. Romer and Romer (1990) argue that bankslikely to be indifferent, which
would mean that (C2) fails to hold.
However, the Romer-Romer argument embodies a highly simplified view of the CD
market. Implicitly, they assume that the supply of CDs available to any bank is perfectly elastic
at the current market rate --i.e,a bank can issue as many CDs as it wants without paying any
premium. There are a number of reasons why this is unlikely to be true in practice.
Given that large denomination CDs (or other instruments that a bank might use to finance
itself in the public capital markets, such as medium-term notes, long-term debt, or equity) are
not federally insured, investors must concern themselves with the quality of the issuing bank.
If there is some degree of asymmetric information between the bank and investors, the standard
sorts of adverse selection problems (see, e.g., Myers and Majluf (1984)) will arise. These
considerations will tend to make the marginal cost of external financing an increasing function
of the amount raised.7
6Another reason why one might expect small banks to hold more securities is if information
problems made it more difficult for them to raise non-deposit external finance on short notice.
See the arguments in section 3.2.C just below.
7See Lucas and McDonald (1992) for a recent model of the banking sector in which adverse
selection problems interfere with banks' ability to raise non-deposit external finance.
21All the availableevidencesupports the notion that default risk is important in the pricing
of wholesale CDs.Large banks'CDs are evaluatedby fiverating agencies,andthe rates paid
bydifferentquality issuers canvary considerably.Moreover, there is considerable intertemporal
variation in the spread betweenaveragemarket-wideCDrates and the rate on riskless T-bils.
To takejust oneexample, the troublesofContinental Illinois in 1984 led to widespread worries
aboutbankhealth,andanincreasein this spread from 40basispointsinApril to nearly150
basis pointsin July.'
The implications of increasing marginal costs of CD financing can be illustrated with a
very simple, partial equilibrium model. (The model also captures the earlier argument that
banks need to hold some securities for liquidity purposes.) Consider a representative bank that
holds as assets reserves (R), loans (L), and bonds (B), and fmances itself with deposits (D) and
CDs (C). The bank seeks to maximize:
(1) Max rLL +r8B-rC,
where rL,r,and rc represent the interest rates on loans, bonds, and CDs respectively. (This
formulation assumes that demand deposits are non-interest-bearing.) The bank is a price-taker
with respect to the first two rates, but perceives rc to be an increasing function of C. The bank
'See Cook and Rowe (1986). Fama (1985) documents that CD rates move very closely with
commercial paper rates. Indeed, both appear to rise relative to T-bill rates during times of tight
monetary policy (Stigum, 1990). In the case of CDs, one possible interpretation is that banks
attempt to issue more CDs as a substitute for deposits during periods of tight money, and that
this increased supply pushes up the rates they must
pay.
22faces the following constraints:
(2) R ￿ kD (Reserve Requirement)
(3) R + B ￿jD(Liquidity Constraint)
(4) R + L + B =C+ D (Assets =Liabilities)
Inequality (2) implicitly assumes that CDs are not subject to any reserve requirement, but
it is easy to generalize the argument to the case where they are just subject to a lower
requirement than deposits. Inequality (3) is meant to capture in as simple a fashion as possible
the sorts of liquidity arguments for holding bonds made in the previous section. To justify it,
one might imagine that a fraction j of the bank's deposits may be redeemed at any point in time,
and that it is prohibitively costly to liquidate loans immediately. Thus the bank must hold
enough bonds so that the sum of bonds and reserves is sufficient to meet redemptions.9 Clearly,
one can develop a somewhat more sophisticated version of this story if one is interested in
making the portfolio demand for bonds less degenerate.
So long as r8 < rL, all three constraints will be met with equality, and the bank's first
order condition is given by:
9Bernanke and Gertler (1987) derive something very similar to our liquidity constraint in the
context of a much more fully specified model of the banking sector.
23(5) rL-rC--CrC
If, as assumed by Romer and Romer, there are no increasing marginal costs of CD
financing, then the loan rate must be exactly equal to the CD rate in equilibrium --inother
words, loans and CDs (or, alternatively, loans and bonds) are perfect substitutes from the
perspective of the banking sector, and (C2) fails.
Things are very different when banks perceive increasing costs of CD issuance. Now,
if the spread between loan and Cl) rates remains unchanged, then the quantity of CDs is pinned
down. Thus the "first-round" response of the banking sector to a $1 decrease in reserves is to
decrease deposits by 1/k, bonds by (j/k -1),and loans by (l-j)/k, while leaving CDs fixed. Of
course, in general equilibrium, these effects may be attenuated, as the spread between loan rates
and CD rates may widen, thereby encouraging more CD issuance. But in any case, loans and
CDs are no longer perfect substitutes, and the spread between them will be affected by shocks
to reserve&°.
3.2.D The impact of risk-based capital requirements
In Section 3.2.B above, we argued that a bank's asset mix of loans and securities was
likely to represent an interior optimum of a portfolio choice problem. The important implication
that follows from this is that the bank will not want to do all of the adjustment to a
contractionary shock by selling securities --inorder to preserve optimality, it will also wish to
'°Tle magnitude of the ultimate general equilibrium effect will depend on the magnitudeof r.
If rc is very small, loan rates will rise only slightly, relative to CD rates, and a large volume
of new CD issuance will take place. Conversely, if r is large, loan rates will rise by relatively
more, and fewer new CD's will be issued.
24decrease its holdings of loans. However, there is an important caveat to this argument. Risk-
based capital requirements (of the sort that have been phased in over the last several years under
the Basle accords) can tie a bank's ability to extend loans to its level of equity capital. If a
bank's lending is constrained by such regulation, then it may do all its marginal adjustments by
buying and selling securities.
This can be easily illustrated in the context of the model sketched above. Risk-based
capital requirements essentially impose an additional constraint of the form:
(6) pL ￿ E,
where p is the capital requirement on loans, and E is the bank's equity. This simple version of
the constraint implicitly (and realistically) assumes that T-bills are not subject to ny capital
requirement.
If it is costly (say because of the information problems that accompany new equity issues
--seeMyers-Majluf (1984)) for a bank to adjust the amount of equity financing it has, then (6)
may bind. It is easy to see that in this case, the liquidityconstraint in (3) will be slack —that
is, the bank will hold more bonds than it needs for liquidity purposes. This is simply because
it does not have enough capital to support more of the higher-yielding loans. Under these
circumstances, monetary policy will have no effect on the bank's desire to invest in loans.
Loans are tied down by (6), and all marginal changes in the bank's portfolio are accomplished
by buying and selling T-bills. (See Bernanke and Lown (1991) for empiricalevidence that bank
capital can be a constraining factor in lending behavior.)
Of course, it is highly unlikely that all or even most banks will face binding capital
25constraints at any point in time. What is the effect of such unconstrained banks? At one
extreme, it might be argued that so long as there are any capital-unconstrained banks, theywill
effectively be the "marginal" lenders in the economy, and hence the banking sector as awhole
will behave as if it was capital-unconstrained. However, such an argument runs into the sorts
of problems raised earlier --itimplicitly disregards the potential for switching costs when
borrowers attempt to move from one bank to another. Our view is that even if just a fraction
of the banks in the economy are capital constrained, this will affect the potency of monetary
policy. Essentially, we are saying that if Bank A is capital constrained, then Fed easingwill not
have the same expansionary effects it otherwise might, because Bank A will not lend any more
than it already is, and because Bank A's customers cannot frictionlessly switch to another
unconstrained bank that is easing its lending policy.
This sort of logic may help to explain why monetary policy was thought by many to be
relatively ineffectual during the 1990-91 recession. To the extent that many (though certainly
not all) banks found their capital positions impaired by large losses on their existing loan
portfolios, and hence found (6) to be binding, the lending channel of monetary transmission
would be weakened. More subtly, if regional shocks were in part responsible for the loan
losses, then monetary policy might have a more powerful effect in some parts of the country --
thoseless-hard hit by the adverse shocks --thanin others.
Similar reasoning also suggests that accounting and regulatory decisions can have
important effects on the potency of monetary policy. If regulators are more aggressive in
forcing banks to acknowledge loan losses, this will tend to reduce bank capital, and again dilute
the effectiveness of the lending channel. Conversely, if capital requirements are relaxed,
26monetary policy might be made somewhat more potent.
Looking to the future, risk-based capital requirements may also play an significant role
in the evolution of the banking system. We noted earlier that an important open question for
monetary policy is the extent to which deposit-taking and loan-making will tend to grow apart
in the years to come. Risk-based capital requirements would seem to have the potential to
accelerate any natural separation of the two activities. In the past, there was a regulation-
induced reason to keep the two together --bytaking deposits and making risky loans, a bank
could raise the value of the subsidy it received from the FDIC. Risk-based capital requirements
reduce this incentive, as would risk-based insurance premiums.
3.3 Imperfect price adjustment and the lending view
As noted earlier, the requirement of imperfect price adjustment is not unique to the
lending view --itis a prerequisite for nytheoryin which monetary policy has real effects.
Accordingly, we do not attempt to survey the enormous literature on the microfoundations of
imperfect price adjustment. Rather, we focus on a much narrower issue: the extent to which
the frictions responsible for imperfect price adjustment might interact with those responsible for
(Cl) and (C2).
The Bernanke-Blinder formulation of the lending view, like traditional IS-LM models,
implicitly assumes that prices are sticky, without providing any explicitmicroeconomic
justification for this assumption. Moreover, the sticky price assumption is completely separated
from the assumptions driving firms' and intermediaries' preferences across loans and bonds --
onecan imagine varying the horizon over which prices adjust without modifying the restof the
model in any substantive way.
27As we have already emphasized, however, the essence of the lendingview can probably
be captured in a wide range of models. For example, if one isuncomfortable with simply
assuming that prices are temporarily fixed, one might appeal tothe type of "limited
participation" dynamic general equilibrium models introduced byGrossman and Weiss (1983)
and Rotemberg (1984) to generate imperfect price adjustment, while still preservingthe other
necessary building blocks for the lendingview."
Although we are not aware of any limited participation models that explicitly set out to
capture the distinction between the money and lending channels,there are a couple that seem
to be quite close to addressing it. Two recent papers by Fuerst (1992a, 1992b) areespecially
relevant. In both of these papers the monetary mechanism works roughly as follows:there are
"households", "firms", and "intermediaries". Both households and firms are subject tocash-in-
advance constraints in all of their transactions.
A monetary shock takes the form of the central bank injecting cash directly intothe
intermediary sector. The important distinction between households and firmsis that firms are
"closer" to the intermediary sector, in the sense that they can transact with intermediaries
without any time lag. Households, in contrast, must wait a period to revise their investment
decisions. This implies that the immediate consequence of a monetary injection is that thefirms
wind up holding all the extra cash for one period. In other words, the firms are the only
participants in this limited participation model, and monetary injections arefunneled to them via
"We are unaware of any empirical evidence that supports the limited particiation assumption.
Thus, both the IS-LM and limited participation models can be criticized for themechanisms used
to produce price rigidity.
28the banking sector.
Monetary policy is non-neutral in this setting, (thanks to the limited participation feature)
and it has compositional effects. The interest rate in the firm lending market will be lower after
a positive monetary shock than the (shadow) interest rate in the household market,since the
firms absorb all of the shock in the short-term. In one version of the model, (Fuerst (1 992a))
the interest rate clears the firm lending market; in the other there is some degree of credit
rationing.
Although Fuerst does not suggest that these models bear specifically on the lending
channel, it seems to us that with a bit of reinterpretation, they might be thought of in this way.
Suppose we relabel Fuerst's "firms" as "bank-dependent firms", andhis "households" as "non-
bank-dependent firms." The model would now have very much the feeling of the lendingview.
In particular, the effects of monetary policy would be transmitted via bank lending policy,and
these effects would fall more heavily on the shoulders of bank-dependent firms.
It is interesting to see where our necessary conditions (Cl), (C2) and (C3), would show
up in such a model. It turns out thatall three are actually embedded in a single timing
assumption --namely,that only bank-dependent firms and intermediaries can transact with each
other without any lag. First, note that since bank-dependent and non-bank-dependentfirms are
effectively "walled off" from each other in the short run, they cannot arbitrage awaydifferences
in borrowing costs. This is (Cl). Second, intermediaries are alsowalled-off from non-bank
dependent firms in the short run. Thus they can only unload acentral bank injection on bank-
dependent firms, and they too cannot arbitrage away differencesin borrowing costs across the
bank-dependent and non-bank-dependent markets. So (C2) issatisfied. Finally, as we have
29already seen, the limited participation feature also generates the imperfect price adjustment
required in (C3).
In one sense, such a formulation of the lending view is quite elegant, since it traces
everything back to a single friction --the(exogenous) cost that prevents non-bank-dependent
firms from participating continuously in the bank lending market. However, this compact
elegance may come at a cost in terms of empirical realism. For example, banks' portfolio
IpreferencesN in this sort of model are purely a short-run phenomenon --inthe short-run, banks
have no choice other than to funnel all of an injection to a subset of firms, but this changes
completely once a "period" elapses. This implies that if monetary policy is ever going to impact
the volume of bank lending, we should see these effects unfold very quickly. As will be shown
in Section 4 below, this implication runs counter to what is seen in the data.
In contrast, in the Bernanke-Blinder formulation of the lending channel, banks (and firms)
are assumed to have well-defined long-run portfolio preferences between loans and bonds. This
formulation therefore does not carry with it the strong implication that any of the changes in
bank lending volume that accompany a monetary policy shock should be manifested immediately.
Thus on this score at least, it does a better job of fitting the facts.
We do not at all mean to suggest that the limited participation/dynamic equilibrium class
of models will ultimately be unable to capture the salient aspects of the lending view. Rather,
we are simply pointing out that there may be some problems in interpreting current versions of
these models as providing an accurate and complete description of the lending view, even if they
capture some of its basic essence. Richer formulations —thatstill use limited participation as
a device to generate imperfect price adjustment, but that provide a more detailed account of
30intermediary portfolio choice --maywell prove to be very successful in modelling the lending
view.
4.Empirical Work on the LendingChannel
Thereare a variety of ways to organize a discussion of the evidence that pertains to
the lending channel. We will begin by reviewing some suggestive, simple correlations that
are open to many interpretations and then progressively introduce morefocused tests that can
be used to distinguish between competing explanations. Most of the literature either
exclusively considers time-series correlations or cross-sectional correlations.While we too
separate our discussion along these lines, we believe thatit is important to keep both bodies
of evidence in mind in assessing the overall plausibility of the lending channel. After
reviewing the evidence, we wrap up with some simple calculations aimed at quantifyingthe
importance of the lending channel.
4.1 Tests Using Aggregate Time-Series Data
Perhaps the simplest implication of the lending channel is that bank loansshould be
closely correlated with measures of economic activity. Figure 2 graphsthe change in non-
farm inventories (as reported in the National Income and Product Accounts) alongwith the
change in commercial and industrial bank loans. The two series are highlycorrelated --the
correlation is 0.4. Similar pictures can be drawn to show a strong correlation betweenbank
loans and unemployment, GNP and other key macroeconomic indicators.
In terms of establishing support for the lending channel, however, suchcorrelations
are inconclusive, because although they are consistent with the implicationsof conditions Cl
and C2, they also admit other interpretations. For example, it may be that thecorrelations
31are driven by changes in the demand for bank loans rather than the supply of bank loans (as
required by Cl). That is, bank loans and inventories might move together because banks
always stand willing to lend and firms finance desired changes in level of inventories with
bank loans. And even if the evidence does in part reflect the impact of variations in loan
supply, it does not establish that these variations can be attributed to changes in monetary
policy, as required by C2.
We thus start by reviewing the data that bears more directly on Cl --thequestion of
whether shifts in loan supply matter. In fact, there is considerable evidence that disruptions
in the banking sector and the attendant shifts in bank loan supply are sometimes responsible
for significant fluctuations in economic activity. One of the most influential of these studies
is Bernanke's (1983) examination of the Great Depression in the United States. Bemanke
examines the extent to which the money view of monetary policy transmission can account
for the decline in U.S. output between 1930 and 1933. He finds that while a standard
monetary model would predict a large drop in output, a significant amount of the decline
cannot be explained by appealing purely to monetary influences. Moreover, not only can
much of the unexplained decline be rationalized by recognizing the disruptive effects of bank
panics, but these panics (and associated financial crises) also seem capable of explaining the
persistence of the Depression. The Bernanke interpretation has become part of the
conventional explanation for the depth and persistence of the Depression in the U.S. and is
one of the strongest pieces of evidence supporting the view that shifts in loan supply can be
quite important.
32Bernanke, in subsequent work with James (1991) has extended this work to analyze
the role of Depression era banking panics in countries besides the U.S. Studying a sample of
24 countries, Bernanke and James (1991) find that there are large output declines during
periods of banking panics that cannot be explained by standard factors, such as trade effects,
interest rates, fiscal policy, etc. Similar results have been uncovered in studies of different
historical episodes in a number of countries.
The literature on credit controls also suggests that disruptions of the lending process
can be quite important (see Owens and Schreft (1992)). Perhaps the clearest example is the
1980 Credit Controls initiated by President Carter. Although the six-point credit restraint
program was only in place from March 14 through July 3, it had a remarkable effect on
borrowing and purchasing patterns (see Schreft (1990) for details). While the controls sought
to discourage all types of credit extensions, in Schreft's words, "the consumer credit controls
were largely symbolic and without teeth." However, the impact on bank lending was very
powerful. She reports that bank loans, which had been growing at an annualized rate of
between 15 and 20 percent prior to the controls, dropped to an annual growth rate of only
2.5 percent for the month of March. In April, total bank loans outstanding fell 5 percent (at
an annual rate). The decline in activity was equally sharp. Real GDP contracted at a 9.9
percent annual rate in the second quarter of the year. Once the controls were lifted, loan
growth and GDP growth resumed at a healthy pace.
Finally, evidence from structural vector autoregressions (VAR's) also supports the
notion that shocks to loan supply have significant real effects. A noteworthy example is
Bernanke (1986). Bernanke proceeds by imposing enough covariance restrictions on the
33disturbance terms in his equations to allow him to identify a structural shock to the
intermediation process. A representative example of his restrictions is that shocks to
aggregate loans are contemporaneously uncorrelated with shocks to military spendingand
money. Thus his identifying assumptions permit a direct investigationof whether Cl holds.
As he notes, a change in monetary policy is one of several candidates for factors that might
disturb the lending process. The resulting instrumental variable estimates suggest that
lending shocks do seem to have a sizable effect on aggregate demand. In a similar vein,
Kuttner (1992) also finds that lending shocks are important for spending.
Of course, for the lending view to be relevant we must go one step further and
demonstrate that condition C2 also holds, i.e., that monetary policy has the power to shift
loan supply. This observation suggests examining the comovements in the stance of
monetary policy, loans and activity --whichin turn requires one to quantify the stance of
monetary policy. Fortunately, the conclusions do not seem be very sensitive tothe use of
any particular indicator of policy. For instance, Bernanke andBlinder (1992) find that
increasesin the Federal funds rate (their measure of the stance of Federal Reserve policy)
lead banks to slowly downsize by shedding loans, and that as loans decline the economy
slows. These findings are reproduced in Figure 3,12
I2 resultsseem to be a bit sensitive to the choice of loan series. Bernanke and Blinder look
at a loan series that captures all types of bank lending. If one instead focuses on lending to
businesses (e.g., Commercial and Industrial loans), loan volume initially increases following an
interest rate hike, but then turns around and begins to decline. As we discuss later, Morgan's
(1992) work suggests that this is largely due to the presence of loan commitments.
34Others researchers have also found that loans adjust gradually (but noticeably)
following a shift in policy. For instance, Romer and Romer (1990) report a similar finding
when they date shifts in policy by studying the language in Federal Open Market Committee
directives. Thus, there does seem to be solid evidence that loan volume responds (albeit with
a lag) to changes in the stance of monetary policy.
The slow adjustment of loans to policy may initially seem to undercut the plausibility
of important effects coming through shifts in loan supply. For example, King (1986) runs a
horse race between loans and monetary aggregates and finds that the latter do a better job of
predicting activity; or said differently, money tends to lead output while loans tend to move
roughly contemporaneously with output. Romer and Romer (1990) find similar results, and
interpret them as cutting against the lending view. And recently, Ramey (1992) has
reconfirmed these findings using a horse race based on a set of error-correction models.13
However, for a couple of reasons we do not think these timing differences are
particularly damaging for the lending view. First, it is natural to believe that the most
immediate consequence of a slowdown would be an undesired buildup of firms' inventories.
This would lead to a short-run increase in the demand for loans to finance the excess
inventories. Thus even if loan supply is contracting, we may not observe a rapid decline in
loan volume.'4
'3Most of these contests show that M2 is the best monetary aggregate for predicting future output
movements. However, from a theoretical perspective, M2 contains many non-transaction
components and therefore is not the most obvious candidate to use to defend the money view.
'4Diamond (1991) also offers a theoretical model that suggests that the demand for intermediated
credit should increase during a downturn.
35A second consideration, emphasized by Bernanke and Blinder, is that the contractual
nature of loan agreements limits the speed with which loan volume can shrink. Recent work
by Morgan (1992) confirms that much of the sluggishness in loan volume is indeed due to
loan commitments. Specifically, Morgan contrasts movements in Commercial and Industrial
loans (C and I loans) made under commitment with movements in C and I loans that are
made without any commitment. In Figure 3, we saw that rising interest rates often are
initially followed by slightly lower unemployment (higher activity); and Morgan finds that
the loans made under commitment largely track these movements in activity. In contrast, he
finds that loans that are made to customers that do not have commitments begin to fall
relatively quickly, responding about as fast and as sharply as monetary aggregates. Thus,
the response of loan supply to movements in monetary policy does seem quite plausible.
However, even taking the effect of loan commitments into account, it appears that
loan supply responds to monetary policy with some lag. This is important to note if one is
interested in applying the LucaslFuerst style models discussed in section 3.3 to capture the
lending view. As noted earlier, current versions of these models generally predict very
rapid responses of loans to monetary policy: the non-participation constraints implicit in these
models are temporary. Thus, one challenge in applying this class of models in this context
will be to come up with a plausible modification that can rationalize the timing patterns
between shifts in policy and changes in lending and output.
Unfortunately, the observation that changes in monetary policy are followed by
changes in both loan quantities and economic activity still does not prove that condition C2
36holds. For example, one way to read these results is that tight monetary policy operates
through standard interest channels to depress economic activity and to reduce the demand for
credit. Consequently, there can be an induced correlation between activity and bank lending
even if there is no lending channel) This identification problem means that although
correlations between policy indicators, bank loans and activity are consistent with the view
that monetary policy works through loan supply, such evidence cannot provide unambiguous
support of the lending view.
One approach to dealing with this identification problem is proposed by Kashyap,
Stein and Wilcox (1992) (KSW). They consider the relative fluctuations in bank loans and a
leading substitute for bank loans: commercial paper. The central KSW insight is that
movements in substitutes for bank financing should contain information about the demand for
bank financing. For example, if bank loans are falling while commercial paper issuance is
rising, then KSW infer that bank loan supply has contracted.
Having made this identifying assumption, KSW propose testing both conditions Cl
and C2. To verify that the central bank can affect loan supply (C2), KSW examine
movements in the "mix" between bank loans and loan substitutes following changes in the
stance of monetary policy.'6 Using both the Federal Funds rate and the Romer's policy
'5However, this alternative explanation has to be stretched to explain Morgan's findings: one
must argue that the demand for loans from non-committed borrowers falls much faster than the
demand of the borrowers with commitments.
'6KSW define their mix variable to be the ratio of bank loans to the sum of bank loans plus
commercial paper.
37proxy, KSW find that when the Fedtightens,commercial paper issuance surges while loans
(slowly) decline --i.e.,the move in the mix indicates loan supply had shifted inward.'7 To
studywhethertheimpliedshifts in loan supply are important(conditionsCl and C3),they
add theirmixvariableto a set ofstructural equationsfor inventory and fixed investment.
Their testsboildown to checking whether theproxyfor loan supply shifts has any additional
explanatory power for investment once other fundamental factors such as the cost of capital
are taken into account.'
KSW find that the mix does seem to have independent predictive power for
investment, particularly inventory investment. Since swings in inventory investment are
central to business cycles and because conventional interest rate effects have proved difficult
to find for inventories, these results are noteworthy. In other words, the KSW findings
provide some support for the view that monetary policy and financial factors may be
important for inventory movements even though standard security market interest rates do not
have much predictive power for inventories.
'7Miron, Romer and Weil (this volume) find that movements in the CP-loan mix are less clear-
cut in response to earlier historical episodes of tight policy --e.g.,those in the early part of the
century. However, given the very different institutional makeup of the markets in these periods,
it is unclear whether the results are directly comparable to those of KSW. See also Bernanke's
discussion of the Miron et. al. paper.
'A similar approach could be used to extend the work by Morgan. For instance, with an
additional assumption that the demand for credit is the same for firms with and without bank
commitments, the difference between the loans extended to the two sets of firms could be used
to isolate shifts in loan supply. The gap between the two types of loans could then be used as
a proxy for loan supply instead of the KSW mix variable.
38Hoshi, Scharistein and Singleton (1991) conduct an analogous set of tests using
aggregate Japanese data. Specifically, they compare the behavior of bank loanswhich were
subject to informal control by the Bank of Japan and loans from insurance companies which
were the main alternative to bank financing. They find that when the Bank of Japan tightens,
the fraction of industrial loans coming from banks drops noticeably --confirmingcondition
C2. They also find that in a four variable VAR (which includes interest rates) the mix is a
significant determinant of both fixed investment and finished goods inventories. Thus, the
Japanese and U.S. data give the basic same message.'9
An alternative way to use information regarding substitutes for bank loans to resolve
the identification problem is to study movements in relative prices rather than relative
quantities. Specifically, changes in loan supply could be identified by checking if the price
of loans increases relative to the price of an alternative such as commercial paper. However,
some care must be taken here since the non-price terms of bank credit (e.g., collateral,
covenants, etc.) may vary systematically over time. In this case, one might expect data such
as the prime rate to be relatively uninformative about the true cost of bank loans, and hence
less useful in resolving the identification problem.2°
Perhaps surprisingly, KSW also find evidence supporting both conditions Cl and C2
using the gap between the prime rate and the commercial paper rate to gauge loan supply:
'9Arguably, the Japanese evidence is less surprising since the Bank of Japan appears to exert
some direct control over loan volume in addition to any indirect control that might comefrom
changing reserves.
20See KSW for further discussion on this point.
39when theFed tightens, the prime rate rises relative to the commercial paper rate.
Furthermore, movements in thisspread helpforecast investment evencontrollingfor the cost
ofcapital. In contrast, however, Kuttner (1992), using simple VAR-type causality tests,
shows that the spread between the prime rate and the commercial paper rate is a poor
predictor of output (much worse than the KSW quantity-based mix variable, which continues
to perform strongly in the VAR-type tests.)2' Thus, the tests with price-based indicators
lead to qualitatively similar conclusions as the tests using quantity-based indicators, although
the findings with the rate spreads seem to be less robust.
Overall,wefind the existing results based on aggregate data fairly supportive of the
lending view. We see a coherent body of evidence, starting with very simple correlations
and moving through a fairly precise set of tests, that suggests that monetary transmission
operates at least partially through induced shifts in loan supply. However, we also recognize
some important limitations that accompany this type of time series analysis. For instance,
one difficulty is that there are relatively few episodes where monetary policy shifts. In
almost all these cases, the shifts occur near recessions, so that many of the correlations we
21Work by Friedman and Kuttner (1992a,b) and Stock and Watson (1989) suggests that a
different interest rate spread, the difference between commercial paper and treasury bill rates,
isa veryreliable predictor of activity. These results might be interpreted as providing some
indirectevidenceon the lending view. For instance, if monetary policy does move loan supply
and thus changes firms' financing patterns, then it seems likely thatpartof the movement in the
bills/paper spread is due to shifts inmonetarypolicy (seeBemanke(1990) and Friedman and
Kuttner (1992b) for details.) However, intermsof the lending view,itisnotclear why the
bills/paper spread would perform so much better than the paper/prime spread in different
forecasting contests. This suggests one area for future work will be to combine the information
in different price and quantity indicators to provide a more complete assessment of the lending
view.
40have discussed also could be uncovered by contrasting behavior during booms and busts.
Since this sort of ambiguity is likely to be very difficult to resolve using only aggregate data,
we think that it is essential to examine other types of evidence.
4.2 Tests Using Cross-sectional Data
There are good reasons to believe that studying cross sectional data might be
particularly helpful in this respect. For one, there is added variation that can be exploited in
cross sectional data. More specifically, there are a rich set of cross-firm implications of the
lending view that are masked at the aggregate level. One key example is that not all firms
are likely to be bank dependent, so some of the hypothesized effects implied by the lending
view should occur for some firms but not for others. The combination of more data and
more precise implications of the theory suggest a powerful set of tests using micro data that
can be used to complement the aggregate findings.
While tests using cross-sectional data do offer considerable promise, they also come
at higher cost because these data require more effort to work with than do aggregate time
series. At this point there has been relatively less work using microdata to specifically
examine the lending view. A couple of notable exceptions are the recent papers by Gertler
and Gilchrist (1992) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) that use information from the
Quarterly Financial Reports, a survey of over 7000manufacturingfirms, to contrast the
behavior of small and large firms. Under the assumption that small firms are much more
likely to be bank-dependent than the larger firms, the comparisons bear on the lending view.
Gertler and Gilchrist (1992) begin by showing that bank loans to small firms decline
significantly when the Fed raises interest rates, while large firms' aggregate external
41financing actually rises. One explanation for the Gertler and Gilchrist findings might be that
some large firms issue commercial paper to finance trade credit that they want to offer to
their smaller customers, who have been cut off from bank financing. In this case,
commercial paper and bank loans are aggregate substitutes (as assumed by KSW) even
though only certain firms can directly issue commercial paper.
Moreover, Gertler and Gilchrist find that the inventory investment of small firms is
much more sensitive to monetary policy shocks than that of large firms. This finding is
compatible with the KSW aggregate evidence on inventories, and we return to it shortly
when we attempt to calibrate the magnitude of the lending channel. Oliner and Rudebusch
(1992) conduct a similar investigation using imputed investment data for small and large
manufacturing firms. They too find that small firms' investment is more sensitive to
movements in a proxy for the stance of the monetary policy.
While this line of work produces conclusions that fit with the cross-sectional
implications of the lending view, the relatively coarse level of disaggregation leaves some
other possibilities open. For example, it might simply be that for technological reasons,
small firms are more recession-sensitive than large firms. This sort of objection can be
KSW do not commit to any particular microeconomic story to rationalize their assumption of
the substitutability of commercial paper and bank loans. However as long as the substitution of
trade credit for bank loans is imperfect, the KSW story makes sense. In other words, the KSW
story in no way hinges on the existence of marginal firms that shift between borrowing through
banks or borrowing through the commercial paper market.
"See, however, Gertler and Hubbard (1989) who take issue with the view that small firms are
more recession-sensitive than large firms.
42partially addressed by using firm-level data.
Several recent papers can be interpreted as firm-level tests of the lending view. In
each case, the authors first identify a set of liquidity-constrained firms and then investigate
whether these liquidity constraints become more binding in the wake of a shift in monetary
policy. To the extent that the liquidity constrained firms are to some degree bank-dependent,
this evidence bears on the lending view.
Hoshi, Scharfstein and Singleton (1991) (HSS) focus on a set of Japanese firms that
would be susceptible to being cut off from banks during times of tight credit --firmswho are
not part of bank-centered industrial groups. HSS investigate whether these 'independentTM
firms' fixed investment becomes more sensitive to cash flow when monetary policy tightens.
Until recently in Japan, assessing the stance of monetary policy was relatively
straightforward because the Bank of Japan (BOJ) explicitly made suggestions to banks about
how much lending to undertake. When the BOJ wanted to tighten it would urge banks to
curtail their lending. And indeed, HSS find that when monetary policy is tight, liquidity is
more important for independent firms' investment than in normal times.
Gertler and Hubbard (1989) conduct a similar study with U.S. data. They build on
the Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) result that the fixed investment of firms that do not
pay dividends is much more sensitive to cash flow and liquidity,than is the fixed investment
of firms that have high dividend payout ratios. Accepting the FHP interpretation that this is
evidence of liquidity constraints, it is possible to ask whether such constraints become more
severe during periods of tight money.
43Studying the FHP sample from 1970 to 1984, Gertler and Hubbard find that the
investment of the low-payout firms does indeed become more sensitive to cash-flow during
the 1974/75 and 1981/82 recessions. Given that tight monetary policy was a factor in both
recessions (see Romer and Romer), these findings lend further support to the lending view.
However, as Gertler and Hubbard note, the following alternative interpretation is also
possible. If information about some borrowers is incomplete, they may be more easily able
to borrowbyposting collateral. During a recession, it may be that collateral values fall. In
this case, even if bank loan supply does not shift inward, the decrease in collateral values
would lead banks to lend less in equilibrium. Discriminating between this "coliateral shock
explanation for the Gertler and Hubbard findings and the lending view is not easy. Both
explanations stress the importance of a cutoff in bank lending as a contributing factor to the
decline in investment, and differ only with respect to the source of this cutoff.
Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1992) (KLS) conduct a similar set of tests using firm-
level inventory data. They focus on the differences between publicly-traded companies that
do and do not have bond ratings. The non-rated companies are typically much smaller than
the rated companies and are likely bank dependent. Because of the myriad of evidence
suggesting that Federal Reserve policy was restrictive prior to 1982, KLS begin their study
with an examination of the 1982 recession. They find that during this episode, the inventory
movements of the non-rated companies were much more dependent on their own cash
holdings than were the inventory movements of the rated companies. (In fact, there is no
significant liquidity effect for the rated companies.)
44In contrast, KLS find that during subsequentperiodsthere is little relation between
cash holdings and inventory movements for the non-rated companies. For instance, during
1985 and 1986, when KLS argue that monetary policy was particularly loose, the correlation
between inventory investment and cash holdings is negative and completely insignificant.
These findings further support the KSW suggestion that financial factors beyond those
captured by open market interest rate play an important role in inventory movements during
recessions.
As with the Gertler and Hubbard results, however, the KLS finding might also be
interpreted as supporting the importance of collateral shocks rather than the lending view.
KLS present some additional tests that try to distinguish between the two explanations. KLS
reason that if the collateral deterioration story is correct, then the cutoff in bank lending
ought to be more pronounced for firms that have high debt levels (i.e., firms that have
limited amounts of uncommitted collateral available). However, KLS find no systematic
relation between debt levels (relative to total assets) and the sensitivity of inventory
investment to cash holdings.
Overall, we read the firm-level evidence as echoing the story that emerges from both
the aggregate data and the partially disaggregated QFR data. Several different studies yield
the same basic conclusion: during periods when monetary policy is tight, it appears that
bank-dependent firms' spending becomes more closely tied to the availability of internal
finance.
43 quantifying the Impact of the Lending Channel
While we are quite confident in asserting that the lending channel exists, we are much
45less certain aboutitsoverall quantitative significance. The ideal way to assess the strength of
the lending channel would be to estimate a fully-specified structural model that captures both
the lending and money channels and then simulate the impact of tightening of monetary
policy. Unfortunately, at this point no such model exists. As a second best alternative, we
discuss three imperfect but quite different approaches to calibrating the importance of the
lending channel.
One set of estimates can be inferred from the work by Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox.
Recall that they use a set of standard structural models for inventory and fixed investment --
thatalready control for open market interest rates and output --andtest whether their
financing mix variable provides any additional explanatory power. The rough idea is that the
mix captures that part of overall financing costs attributable to the lending channel. KSW
find that the coefficients on this the mix are sufficiently big that a shock similar to the one
that followed the Fed's October 1979 shift in policy results in an extra 1 percent decline in
GNP. As noted earlier, most of this extra adjustment takes place in inventories. It is also
worth noting that by construction this estimate ignores any possible effects that might operate
through other channels such as consumers' expenditures on durables.
An alternative strategy would be to begin with the Gertler-Gilchrist comparison of the
inventory behavior of small and large manufacturing firms. Using a VAR framework, they
find that there is a sharp difference in the way the two types of firms respond to a Romer
date impulse: eight quarters after a Romer date, large firm inventories are usually up by five
percent, while small firm inventories are typically down by about 11 percent. The cumulative
impact of the small firms is significant --theybring the aggregate inventory accumulation
46down from five percent to roughly two percent.
Making the (perhaps strong) assumption that the large-small differential is entirely
attributable to the lending channel, this result suggests that the lending channel causes
manufacturing inventories to be three percent lower than they otherwise would be. This
implies a fairly modest effect in terms of GNP. For example, considering again to the
October 1979 shift in Fed policy, according to the QFR the stock of manufacturing
inventories was roughly 250 billion as of the fourth quarter of 1979. A three percent decline
in this stock, therefore represents about .30 percent drop in GNP. According to Blinder and
Maccini (p. 76) manufacturing firms held an average of about 60 percent of total
manufacturing and trade inventories (between 1959 and 1986). So, if one further assumes
that the inventory behavior of the non-manufacturing firms is similar to that of the
manufacturing firms, then the total economy-wide inventory effect would be about .5 percent
of GNP (.5 =.301.60).Thus, the size of the effect as calibrated from the Gertler-Gilchrist
data is roughly consistent with the effect reported by KSWusingaggregate data.
Finally, to take a different tack, one might ask how much of the potency of monetary
policy can be confidently ascribed to the money view of transmission. In other words, one
might try to calibrate the magnitude of the lending view by working backwards: make an
estimate of the importance monetary policy, decide how much of this can be traced to open
market interest rate effects, and then impute any remaining effects to the lending channel.
Of course this approach puts the "burden of proof" squarely on the money view, and
therefore highlights the choices that one implicitly must make in calibrating the size of these
47effects.
This example is particularly provocative because interest rate effects are notoriously
hard to find fçr many categories of investment spending. For instance, Blinder and Maccim,
in surveyingtheliterature on inventories conclude (p. 82) that empirical research geney
fails to uncover any influence of real interest rates on inventory investment, especially for
finished goods in manufacturing." Given the large role of inventories in cyclical fluctuations
this should force a diehard believer in the money view to ask whether it is plausible to
maintain that monetary policy has no direct effect on inventories.
Similarly, direct attempts to estimate the relationship between real interest rates and
aggregate output (usually under the guise of estimating the slope of the IS curve) often find
that there is little relationship between the two. For instance, Hirtle and Kelleher (1990)
survey the literature on the interest sensitivity of the economy (and how it might have
changed because of financial market deregulation) and note that there is little consensus on
whether real interest rates matter much. For instance, their own results suggest that there is
no significant relationship between (short-term) real interest rates and output. This sort of
finding suggests that one could take an extreme stand and claim that all of monetary policy's
potency comes via a lending channel! While we think this claim is too strong, we think it is
equally disingenuous to tilt a calculation so that the money channel by default gets the bulk
of any unexplained variation.
On the whole, the literature on the lending channel thus far does not very precisely
pin down the quantitative importance of the effects. Some of this problem arises because
48there is still no widely accepted theoretical model that both satisfactorily captures all the
important potential channels and can be estimated. Not surprisingly the result is that one can
come up with a wide range of estimates. The KSW and Gertler-Gilchrist numbers suggest a
meaningful though moderate impact, while the "name the residual strategy" --claimingall of
the non-interest rate effects for the lending channel —suggestsa potentially huge impact.
More careful attempts to narrow the range are likely to be one of the leading topics of work
in this area.
5.Conclusions
This paper was designed to accomplish three goals. First, we wanted to clarify what
is meant by the lending view of monetary policy transmission. Ultimately, the lending view
boils down to the two part assertion that 1) open market operations affect the supply of bank
loans; and 2) that these loan supply shifts in turn affect both the magnitude of aggregate
output and its composition. The essential ingredient that underlies this mechanism is the
imperfect substitutability of bank loans and publicly issued bonds, both as corporate liabilities
as bank assets.
In contrast, quantity rationing in the loan market is not necessary for there to be a
meaningful lending channel, although in practice such rationing is likely to be present to
some degree. Thus, as we have defined things, the lending view of monetary policy
transmission is a subset of the larger literature that connects financial market imperfections
and the real economy. Of course, even if our narrow version of the lending channel does
not apply, there may be other ways in which financial market imperfections shape the
consequences of monetary policy (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
49Similarly, the lending view need not imply that the more traditional money channel of
policy transmission is inoperative; clearly the two channels can coexist and can be
complementary to each other. Nonetheless, the distinction between the two is an important
one --aswe have stressed, the existence of a lending channel can influence both the potency
and the distributional consequences of monetary policy, as well as the information content of
a variety of indicators that policymakers look to.
A second goal of the paper was to outline the microfoundations that are needed to
rationalize the existence of the lending channel. The bottom line here is that while the large
existing literature on financial contracting and intermediation already provides much of what
is needed, there remain some thorny problems that have thus far received little formal
modelling attention. One particular area that would appear to require further work is that
corresponding to condition (C2) --thelink between Fed-induced shocks to reserves and the
aggregate supply of intermediated loans.
Our final goal was to collect the empirical evidence the bears on the lending view. In
our view, the evidence for the existence of a lending channel is already quite strong —there
are a number of papers that document facts that would be very difficult to explain under the
pure money view of monetary policy transmission. Importantly, this evidence comes from a
number of sources, uses both aggregate and cross-sectional data, and for the most part
produces results that complement each other.
While there is surely more work to be done in terms of building a definitive case for
the existence of the lending channel, a perhaps more important (and difficult) task for future
research is to provide a relatively precise assessment of its quantitative importance. At this
50point, we remain quite uncertain about the exact magnitude of the lending channel impacts
across a variety of sectors. Learning more about these magnitudes will be of vital
importance if this line of research is ever to provide anything more than qualitative help to
policymakers.
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for BanksinDifferent Size Classes.
1976- 1990
LarEeBanks Medium Banks Small Bank,;
(Largest 1 %) (75-99percentile) (betow75%)
76 8.l% 26.5% :7.2%
78 17.4% 23.7% 24.0%
'80 17.2% 25.3% 26.4%
'82 15.7% 24.8% 27.8%
'84 12.4% 23.5% 27.6%
'86 [5.2% 22.3% 26.5%
'88 15.0% 21.8% 28.5%
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